



# **CENTRO DE DOCTRINA DO EXÉRCITO**

## **Seminário FTC – GT 3**



**Cel Péricles**  
**Cel Migon**  
**Cel Guarino**  
**Cel R1 Loureiro**  
**Cel R1 Sá**  
**Cel R1 Bochi**  
**TC Vaz**  
**TC Basílio**  
**Maj Kosciureski**  
**Maj Dardano**  
**Maj David**  
**Coordenador: TC Ferreira**



# CENTRO DE DOCTRINA DO EXÉRCITO

## SUMÁRIO

1. Moldura conceitual
2. Questões propostas (C Dout Ex)
3. Debates



# **CENTRO DE DOCTRINA DO EXÉRCITO**

## **Moldura conceitual**

### **Metodologia de Planejamento:**

- Doutrina de Operações Conjuntas
- PPCOT

### **Quadro de Cargos**

- C Mil A: EM e CCOp (exceção: CMSE)
- DE: EM e CCOp

### **Tipos de Operações: Guerra (Não Guerra)**

### **Flexibilidade**

### **Doutrina Operacional x Tática**

**“Evolução”: Etta + mobilização + adjudicação etc.**



# **CENTRO DE DOCTRINA DO EXÉRCITO**

## **Questões propostas**

**A estrutura prevista no Manual EB20-MC-10.202 (FTC) atende de forma satisfatória ao proposto?**

- 1. Sim. O QC CCOp/CMilA permite a evolução para a Etta EM prevista no Manual. (Obs: DOAMEPI).**
- 2. Os três casos previstos no Manual podem ser atendidos pela evolução do CCOp. A designação do Cmdo e da evolução depende dos Fatores da Decisão (Obs: DOAMEPI).**
- 3. O previsto no Manual atende as necessidades da Componente Terrestre no TO e/ou na ZD. Na ZI, não se visualiza a necessidade.**



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## Questões propostas

**Quais são os encargos do CCOp?**

**1. Em termos doutrinários → evoluir para integrar a Componente Terrestre (Obs: EM CMilA → CCj)**

**2. Em tempo de paz:**

- Coor e Ct as Op Correntes (Emprego)**
- Planejar e conduzir o PAA G Cmdo/GU (Obs: CMA / CMO)**
- Outros, Confe determinado pelo C Mil A (Obs: CMNE)**

**-**



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## **Questões propostas**

**A existência do CCOp (Guerra, paz, estrutura dentro de um Cmdo Mil A)**

- 1. A previsão de CCOp junto aos C Mil A trouxe reflexos positivos no Preparo e Emprego da Fter**
- 2. A concepção para situação de GUERRA atende à situação de NÃO GUERRA, devendo o processo de evolução ser analisado à luz dos Fatores da Decisão (Obs: DOAMEPI)**



# **CENTRO DE DOCTRINA DO EXÉRCITO**

## **Questões propostas**

**O CCOp mobilia o EM Cj ou C Ex?**

- 1. O CCOp evolui para integrar o EM da Componente Terrestre**
- 2. O EM C Mil A evolui para integrar o Cmdo Cj**
- 3. Outras soluções podem ser tomadas caso-a-caso (Fat Dcs)**



# CENTRO DE DOCTRINA DO EXÉRCITO

## Alguns subsídios

### ARMY COMPONENT (ARFOR) IN CAMPAIGNS AND MAJOR OPERATIONS

4-2. The corps headquarters is organized, trained, and equipped to serve as the ARFOR in campaigns and major operations, with command of two or more Army divisions, together with supporting theater-level organizations, across the range of military operations. As the ARFOR for the JFC, the corps serves as an operational-level headquarters, conducting land operations as the Service component. The corps can control up to five Army divisions in large-scale combat operations. The corps normally has one ESC and one medical brigade (support) in direct support. Other theater-level assets are attached as required. The headquarters of the corps allows it to adapt to operational- or tactical-level roles, depending upon the combatant commander's requirements.

### OPERATIONS AT THE CORPS LEVEL

5-1. The corps headquarters is the most versatile of the echelons above brigades. It may become a joint and multinational headquarters responsible for conducting deterrence, crisis response, and limited contingency operations. In campaigns and major operations, the corps commands multiple divisions and attached brigades, serves as the land component, and serves as the operational-level headquarters for the employment of landpower. The corps headquarters participates in multinational exercises designed to improve OPLANs and theater security in each of the geographic combatant commands.



# CENTRO DE DOCTRINA DO EXÉRCITO

## Alguns subsídios

### OPERATIONAL ART

5-5. Planning horizons are much longer at the corps level than for the division. Corps-sized operations rarely take less than a week and may require several months to achieve a campaign objective. The corps commander shapes throughout an operational environment to set the conditions for the tactical success of subordinate divisions. In practice, this means that the corps is shaping and sustaining in preparation for the next phase of operations, while the divisions are conducting tactical shaping and the decisive operation within the current phase. Because the corps operates at the nexus of operational and tactical levels, the ability of the corps commander to influence current operations is more limited than that of the subordinate division commanders. The commander can shift joint capabilities and alter the boundaries between divisions relatively quickly. Changing task organization, committing the corps reserve, and modifying lines of operation and sustainment priorities take time and intensive staff coordination. The corps commander anticipates requirements, requests joint capabilities, and repositions forces and resources for the next phase of operations. The corps staff coordinates with higher, adjacent, and subordinate headquarters to ensure that plans and tactical conditions for the next phase of operations are set.



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## Alguns subsídios

### **PLANNING**

II-39. The joint operation planning at the JFLC command headquarters is predominately at the operational level of war. Land force planning links the tactical employment of land forces to campaign and strategic objectives. The focus at the command level is on operational art—the use of military forces to achieve strategic objectives through the design, organization, and execution of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles.

command at the corps is through the divisions. The corps' focus is normally at the operational level, and its planning horizons are different. In short, the corps commander provides the division commander with the combat power needed to fight battles and conduct tactical operations envisioned for that phase of operations, while the corps sets the conditions for the next phase through interdependent joint capabilities.



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## Alguns subsídios

### DECISIVE ACTION

5-83. The scope and scale of corps operations ensure that corps forces conduct simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. For purposes of this section, the discussion of offense, defense, and stability considers that most corps forces are engaged in that related set of tasks. To understand decisive action in corps operations, this publication reviews two distinct roles for the corps. The first, and more common employment of the corps, is that of a land component command. As a land component, the corps functions at the operational level, translating campaign objectives into tactical tasks for subordinate units. The overall size of the land component varies, but it typically includes two or three divisions or their equivalent. In most campaigns, the land component is the principal component used by the JFC to achieve the end state.

Plans are an important way for the JFLCC to communicate with and unify the efforts of the joint land force. Joint land force operational planning links the tactical employment of land forces to campaign and strategic objectives through the achievement of operational goals. **The focus of JFLCC planning is on operational art** — the use of military forces to achieve strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles.




# CENTRO DE DOCTRINA DO EXÉRCITO

<u>World War II C2</u> (Remagen, 1945)	<u>Gulf War C2</u> (Desert Storm, 1991)	<u>21st Century C2</u> (Information Age)
Theater Commander		
Army Group	CINC, USCENTCOM	CINC, Unified Command
Army	Army	JFLCC
Corps	Corps	
Division	Division	Combat Group
Regiment	Brigade	
Battalion	Battalion	Battalion
Company	Company	Company



# CENTRO DE DOCTRINA DO EXÉRCITO

## Too Many Echelons - Too Slow to Decide - Too Expensive to Modernize





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## **CONCLUSÃO**

**5 JUL 18**